The Cryptography of a Post-Quantum Internet

Abstract
Quantum computing threatens the cryptographic foundations of modern global infrastructure. This requires an urgent transition to post-quantum cryptography. My research advances this transition through two complementary approaches: lattice-based schemes, which offer exceptional computational efficiency, and isogeny-based constructions, which achieve the smallest keys and signatures in the post-quantum landscape. This talk focuses on SQlsign, the leading isogeny-based signature in the NIST standardization process. I will present my recent breakthrough, SQlsign2D, which positions the protocol as a top contender for global standardization. By working over two-dimensional abelian varieties, we avoid the computational bottlenecks of previous iterations, achieving a 15x speedup in signing and a 4x speedup in verification. This geometric approach also leads to the first complete reduction to hard mathematical problems, closing a significant gap in the protocol's security analysis. Finally, I will outline my future research program to secure the post-quantum internet, targeting advanced primitives (such as privacy-preserving authentication and updatable encryption) that currently lack valid solutions. My goal is to exploit deep algebraic and geometric structures to build protocols that are both provably secure and practically efficient.

Speaker Biography

Dr Andrea Basso is a Postdoctoral Researcher at IBM Research specializing in post-quantum cryptography. His work bridges rigorous mathematical theory and practical deployment, covering both the foundational security of isogeny-based schemes and the optimization of lattice-based protocols. Dr Andrea has co-designed several advanced protocols, including the isogeny-based encryption scheme POKE and the PRISM signature scheme, which received the Best Paper Award at PKC 2025. Beyond theory, he is deeply engaged in the global standardization process: he was a member of the team behind Saber (a NIST finalist) and currently contributes to the security analysis and standardization of SQlsign at NIST. His research on protocol design and efficient instantiation has resulted in over 20 peer-reviewed papers and nine patent applications. Dr Andrea holds a PhD from the University of Birmingham and previously held research positions at the University of Bristol, Visa Research, and Intel Labs.