Intentionalism as an Ontology of Reasons for Actions

My aim in this talk is to adapt the use of intentionalism in the philosophy of mind and perception to the philosophy of action, as an alternative ontology of reasons for action to psychologism and factualism. I shall begin by providing an overview of key issues raised by the ontology of reasons of action, followed by discussing the two dominant ontologies of reasons of action – psychologism and factualism, including their advantages and disadvantages. These two mutually exclusive ontologies pose a dilemma. Then, I shall present intentionalism as an alternative ontology of reasons and show how it preserves the advantages of the two dominant ontologies, avoids their disadvantages, offers a comprehensive ontology of reasons of action, and a way out of the dilemma.

George Wong Soo Lam is a senior lecturer at the Singapore University of Social Sciences in the College of Interdisciplinary and Experiential Learning. His research interests focus on metaphysics, Buddhist philosophy, and comparative philosophy. He has published on metaphysics, specifically on causation, emergence, and material constitution.