Good Reasoning and Reasons to Suspend Judgment

A promising constitutive account of reasons says that they are premises of good reasoning. This account seems well placed to handle reasons for belief. However, some have objected that it has implausible implications about reasons to suspend judgment. The aim of this paper is to address these objections, and more broadly to consider how a proponent of the account should think about reasons to suspend.

Conor McHugh (University of Southampton) has worked on a range of topics in epistemology, value theory, and philosophy of mind. These include the nature of belief and of attitudes more generally, normativity, reasons and reasoning, mental agency, doxastic non-voluntarism and self-knowledge. He has published in leading journals and is the co-author, with Jonathan Way, of ‘Getting Things Right: Fittingness, Reasons, and Value’ (forthcoming with OUP).