Moore and Brentano: Realism and Reflexivity

It has been argued by a number of authors that early analytic philosophy of mind is in many ways ‘Brentanian’.  I revisit the arguments of G.E. Moore’s famous Refutation of Idealism in order to highlight one stark contrast: Moore’s influential realism about awareness commits him (and his followers like the early Russell) to a very un-Brentanian view of awareness of awareness.  

 

It is an interesting question whether this view of awareness of awareness falls to Brentano’s criticisms of ‘higher-order’ theories of awareness of awareness.  I concentrate on the converse question of whether realism about awareness articulates a compelling objection to (increasingly popular) Brentanian ‘same-order’ theories of awareness of awareness.  If objects of awareness are ‘there anyway’, then how could awareness be of itself?