An Analysis of Brute-Force Break-ins of a Palmprint Authentication System

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Abstract— Biometric authentication systems are widely applied because they offer inherent advantages over classical knowledge-based and token-based personal identification approaches. This has led to the development of products using palmprints as biometric traits and their use in several real applications. However, as biometric systems, are vulnerable to replay, database and brute-force attacks, such potential attacks must be analyzed before biometric systems are massively deployed in security systems. This paper proposes a projected multinomial distribution for studying the probability of successfully using brute-force attacks to break into a palmprint system. To validate the proposed model, we have conducted a simulation. Its results demonstrate that the proposed model can accurately estimate the probability. The proposed model indicates that it is computationally infeasible to break into the palmprint system using brute-force attacks.

Index Terms— brute-force attack, palmprint, passwords, secure authentication.

I. INTRODUCTION

Current security systems which automatically identify individuals commonly use either tokens of private knowledge such as a password or a private possession such as a smart card. Such tokens are insecure in that they can be lost, shared, stolen, or duplicated. In this respect, biometric authentication approaches that use physiological and behavioral characteristics such as the iris, retina, fingerprint, palmprint, signature, or gait [2] are much more secure. They are not, however, invulnerable. For example, they are open to database, replay, and brute-force attacks.

Fig. 1 shows a number of points, Points 1-8, all being vulnerable points as identified by [4-5]. The potential attack points are between and on the common components of a biometric system, input sensor, feature extractor, matcher and database and are especially open to attack when biometric systems are employed on remote, unattended applications, giving attackers enough time to make complex and numerous attempts to break in. At Point 1, a system can be spoofed using fake biometrics such as artificial gummy fingerprints and face masks [6]. At Point 2, it is possible to avoid liveness tests in the sensors by using a pre-recorded biometric signal such as a fingerprint image. This is a so-called replay attack. At Point 3, the original output features can be replaced with a predefined feature by using a Trojan horse to override the feature extraction process. At Point 4, it is possible to use both brute-force and replay attacks, submitting on the one hand numerous synthetic templates or, on the other, prerecorded templates. At Point 5, original matching scores can be replaced with preselected matching scores by using a Trojan horse. At Point 6, it is possible to insert templates from unauthorized users into the database or to modify templates in the database. At Point 7, replay attacks are once again possible. At Point 8, it is possible to override the system’s decision output and to collect the matching scores to generate the images in the registered database [15].

Recently, many biometric and security researchers have proposed techniques for preventing and detecting these attacks [3-5, 7-9, 12, 17, 22-23]. Some researchers have employed watermarking and encryption to prevent replay attacks at Points 2, 4, and 7 [9, 17, 22] and have developed anti-spoofing techniques for specific biometrics to prevent attacks at Point 1 [3, 12]. Other researchers have produced analyses of specific attack types vis-à-vis specific biometrics, for example, brute-force attacks at Point 4 of fingerprint systems [4-5, 7]. Unfortunately, the analysis of brute-force break-ins against fingerprint systems is not applicable to palmprint systems since the template formats of fingerprints and palmprints are different.
Given the commercial potential of palmprint systems as security applications, the wide variety of capture devices that now exist, and the diversity of preprocessing, feature extraction, matching and classification algorithms [1,10-11,16,18-20] that have been produced in the field over the last seven years, it is certainly the case that any security issues should be systematically addressed prior to their widespread deployment. In this paper, we respond to this need by being the first to our knowledge to successfully consider security issues in palmprint systems. Initially, we concentrate on brute-force attacks at Point 4. We will discuss other potential attacks in forthcoming papers.

To prevent brute-force attacks, security systems based on passwords allow limited number traits within a period of time. The systems block the access for a certain amount of period if the limit is over. However, this scheme is not suitable for identification systems (1-to-many matching systems), as the palmprint system described in this paper since this scheme would block the accesses of all users.

The rest of this paper is organized as the follows. Section 2 provides a brief summary of our palmprint system. Section 3 develops a probabilistic model describing the relationship between false acceptance rates and the number of attacks. Section 4 validates the proposed model and gives the experimental results. Section 5 offers some concluding remarks.

II. A SUMMARY OF THE PALPRINT SYSTEM EXPLOITING COMPETITIVE CODE

In this Section, we briefly introduce our system, which employs a palmprint identification algorithm known as Competitive Code [19]. We choose to analyze Competitive Code in the context of brute-force attacks rather than other palmprint verification algorithms [13-14, 21] because it is the most accurate and the computationally fastest algorithm developed by Zhang and his co-workers. The version of Competitive Code used in this work has been modified so that it can re-issue new templates when original templates have been compromised. In other words, the new Competitive Code provides cancelable palmprint representation [4-5, 7].

Like other biometric systems, a typical palmprint verification or identification system consists of four components: an image acquisition component, a preprocessing component, a feature extraction component, and a matching component [10-11, 16]. The specifics of the four components of our system are as follows.

1) The image acquirer: This component transmits a palmprint image from the palmprint scanner to a computer. Fig. 2(a) shows a palmprint scanner developed by the Biometrics Research Centre of The Hong Kong Polytechnic University. Its design principles can be found at [10].

2) The preprocessor: This component detects the two key points between fingers to establish a coordinate system for aligning different palmprint images. The coordinate system is then used to extract the central parts of palmprint images. Fig. 2(b) shows the key points and the coordinate system and Fig. 2(c) shows a preprocessed palmprint image.

3) The feature extractor: Our original algorithm applies six real Gabor filters with fixed orientations to a preprocessed palmprint image, I(x,y) [19] to estimate the local orientation field as features. The filters are defined as

\[ \psi(x, y, x_0, y_0, \alpha, \theta, \kappa) = \frac{\theta}{2\pi} e^{-\frac{(x-x_0)^2}{2\sigma^2}} \cos(\alpha x + \theta + \kappa x y) \]

where \( x' = (x-x_0)\cos\theta + (y-y_0)\sin\theta, \)

\( y' = -(x-x_0)\sin\theta + (y-y_0)\cos\theta, \)

\( (x_0, y_0) \) is the center of the function, \( \omega \) is the radial frequency in radians per unit length, and \( \theta \) is the orientation of the Gabor filters in radians. \( \kappa \) is defined as \( \kappa = \sqrt{2\ln2 - \left(\frac{2\delta + 1}{2\delta - 1}\right)} \), where \( \delta \) is the half-amplitude bandwidth of the frequency response. The original orientations of the six filters, \( \theta \), are \( \pi/6 \), where \( v = 0, 1, 2, 3, 4 \) and 5. The orientation of a local region is estimated using a competitive rule,

\[ k = \arg\min_{\{1, \ldots, 5\}} (I(x, y) * \psi(x, y, x_0, \alpha, \theta, \kappa)) \]

where \( * \) represents convolution and \( k \) is called the winning index. To achieve cancelable representation, we embed a random field \( \alpha(x_0, y_0) \) following uniform distribution with support 0, \( \pi/6 \), 2\( \pi/6 \), 3\( \pi/6 \), 4\( \pi/6 \) and 5\( \pi/6 \). The value of \( \alpha(x_0, y_0) \) depends on the filter center \( (x_0, y_0) \). As the result, the competitive rule becomes

\[ k = \arg\min_{\{1, \ldots, 5\}} (I(x, y) * \psi(x, y, x_0, \alpha + \alpha(x_0, y_0), \kappa)) \].

When we re-issue a new template, we need only to replace the original random field with a new random field. Fig. 2(d) shows a final feature code. The random field destroys all the line features and therefore looks like a noisy image. We still refer to the final feature code as Competitive Code.

4) The angular comparer: This component compares two Competitive Codes by using angular distance. Table 1 gives all the possible angular distances between two winning indexes. Summing up all the angular distances at different positions, we have the angular distance between two Competitive Codes defined as

\[ A_j(P, Q) = \sum_{i=1}^{32} \sum_{j=1}^{32} A(P_{i,j}, Q_{i,j}) \]

where \( P_{i,j} \), \( Q_{i,j} \) is a winning index of Competitive Code, \( P(Q) \) at position \( (x, y) \) and \( A(P_{i,j}, Q_{i,j}) \) is the angular distance between the two winning indexes. To support real-time identification in large databases, we provide a coding scheme to encode the winning indexes so that we can implement angular distance using Boolean operators. Table 2 gives the coding scheme. The corresponding bitwise angular distance is defined as

\[ A_j(P, Q) = \sum_{i=1}^{32} \sum_{j=1}^{32} \sum_{k=1}^{32} P_{i,j}(x, y) \odot Q_{i,j}(x, y) \]

where \( P_{i,j}(Q_{i,j}) \) is the \( i \)th bit plane of \( P(Q) \) and \( \odot \) is bitwise exclusive OR. Occasionally, as a result of the incorrect placement of hands, some palmprints contain non-palmprint pixels. All the non-palmprint pixels are black since they belong to the capture device. We can use a simple threshold to classify them. We use a bit plane as a mask to denote the non-palmprint pixels. Finally, the bitwise angular distance is defined as
where \( \cap \) is bitwise AND and \( P_{m}(Q_{m}) \) is the mask of \( P(Q) \). Obviously, \( A_{y} \) is between 0 and 1. For perfect matching, the angular distance is zero. To account for alignment imperfections, we generate 25 translated Competitive Codes by translating the preprocessed image. In other words, we have 25 angular distances when we match two palmprints. The minimum of these distances is regarded as the final angular distance, \( A_{y} \). Using a 3GHz processor, the bitwise angular distance can make 100,000 comparisons per second.

\[
A_{y}(P,Q) = \frac{3^{24} \sum_{y=1}^{24} \sum_{x=1}^{24} (P_{m}(x,y) \cap Q_{m}(x,y)) \cap (P(x,y) \oplus Q(x,y))}{3^{24} \sum_{y=1}^{24} \sum_{x=1}^{24} P_{m}(x,y) \cap Q_{m}(x,y)}
\]  

III. A PROBABILISTIC MODEL FOR ANALYZING BRUTE-FORCE BREAK-INS

The study of brute-force break-ins requires a probabilistic model that describes the relationship between the number of attacks and the probability of a false acceptance. Therefore, it is necessary to establish a probabilistic model for the angular distance given in Eq. 4. To simplify the model, we assume that all preprocessed palmprint images are clear and devoid of non-palmprint pixels. This will allow us to neglect the masks and the normalization terms. We could get exactly the same result for this analysis by using either the integer representation or the bitwise representation of Competitive Code, but for purposes of presentation it is more convenient to use the integer representation. Thus, we consider the angular distance given in Eq. 2 for the following analysis.

Let \( W = [w_{x}, w_{1}, w_{2}, w_{3}] \) be a random vector where \( w_{i} \) is the number of \( A_{y}(P_{i}, Q_{i}) = i \) in Eq. 2 and let \( p_{i} \) be the probability of \( A_{y}(P_{i}, Q_{i}) = i \). As a result, the angular distance described in Eq. 2 can be rewritten as \( A_{y}(P,Q) = WK^{T} \), where \( K = [0, 1, 2, 3] \). We assume that \( p_{i} \) is stationary and \( A_{y}(P_{i}, Q_{i}) \) is independent. By stationary we mean that \( p_{i} \) does not depend on the pixel \( (x, y) \). Using these assumptions, we infer that \( W \) follows multinomial distribution i.e.

\[
f(w_{x}, w_{1}, w_{2}, w_{3}) = \frac{n!}{w_{x}!w_{1}!w_{2}!w_{3}!} p_{w_{x}}^{n} p_{w_{1}}^{n} p_{w_{2}}^{n} p_{w_{3}}^{n},
\]

where \( n \) is equal to 1024, the size of the Competitive Codes. Thus, the probability density function of the angular distance, \( A_{y}(P,Q) \) is

\[
Pr(A_{y}(P,Q) = i) = \sum_{W \in W_{K}^{T}} f(w_{x}, w_{1}, w_{2}, w_{3}).
\]

Since \( f \) is a multinomial distribution and the summation can be regarded as a projection on the line \( WK^{T} = i \), we call this distribution “projected multinomial distribution”.

Let \( Pr(A_{y}(P,Q) < t) = F(t) \) and therefore

\[
Pr(A_{y}(P,Q) \geq t) = 1 - F(t),
\]

where \( F(t) \) is the cumulative distribution of \( A_{y}(P,Q) \). The probability of the final angular distance \( A_{y} \) being greater than the threshold \( t \) is

\[
Pr(A_{y}(P,Q) \geq t) = (1 - F(t))^{n},
\]

where \( m \), the number of translated matchings is 25. If we make \( z \) independent comparisons, the probability of all the final angular distances being greater than or equal to \( t \) is

\[
Pr(A_{y}(P_{i}, Q_{i}) \geq t \forall i = 1, ..., z) = (1 - F(t))^{mn},
\]

where \( P_{i} \) and \( Q_{i} \) represent different Competitive Codes. Consequently, the probability of at least one of the final angular distances being shorter than \( t \) is

\[
Pr(min_{i}(A_{y}(P_{i}, Q_{i})) < t) = 1 - (1 - F(t))^{mn},
\]

We can now analyze brute-force attacks against our palmprint system using Eq. 9. For verification, each attackers’ template, \( P_{i} \) is compared only with the templates associated with a particular user. We assume that each user only has one template, \( Q \) in the database and to attack the system the

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**TABLE 1 ALL POSSIBLE ANGULAR DISTANCES BETWEEN DIFFERENT WINNING INDEXES**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Angular Distance ( A(P_{x}, Q_{x}) )</th>
<th>Winning indexes, ( P_{x}, Q_{y} )</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0 1 2 3 4 5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0 1 2 3 2 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1 0 1 2 3 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2 0 1 2 3 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3 3 2 1 0 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4 2 3 2 1 0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5 1 2 3 2 1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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**TABLE 2 BITWISE REPRESENTATION OF THE COMPETITIVE CODE**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Winning indexes</th>
<th>Bit 1</th>
<th>Bit 2</th>
<th>Bit 3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Now we can use the proposed model to estimate the predictive power of the proposed model. As the winning index follows uniform distribution. We also have

\[ \Pr(\min_x A_e(P, Q) < t) = 1 - (1 - F(t))^b, \]

the same as in Eq. 9.

For identification, each submitted templates, \( P_i \), as a brute-force attack is compared with all the templates in the database. Let the templates in the database be \( Q_j \) where \( j = 1, \ldots, b \). As in the previous discussion, we let the number of templates for the brute-force attack be \( z \). Therefore, the probability of false acceptance occurring in an identification system with \( b \) templates in the database is

\[ \Pr(\min_j A_e(P_i, Q_j) < t) = 1 - (1 - F(t))^b, \]

Eq. 10 for verification and Eq. 11 for identification each share the same form, so, for simplicity of presentation, in the following experiments we shall consider only verification.

IV. MODEL VALIDATION AND EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS

The use of the probabilistic model to analyze brute-force attacks requires us to make some assumptions when obtaining the model parameters \( p_v \). We assume that the winning indexes of Competitive Code \( Q \) follow independent uniform distributions. In other words, \( \Pr(Q_{x,v} = v) = 1/6 \), for all \( v = 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, \) and \( 5 \). This assumption holds since the random field is formed by independent uniform distributions. We do not make any assumptions as to the winning indexes of the artificial Competitive Codes, \( P_i \). Let \( c_v \) be the probability of the winning index of \( P_i \) being equal to \( v \). Using Table 1, we can infer that

\[ p_0 = \frac{\frac{\sum_{v=0}^5 c_v}{6}}{1/6} = 1/6, \quad p_1 = \frac{\sum_{v=0}^5 c_v}{6} = 1/3, \]

\[ p_2 = \frac{\sum_{v=0}^5 c_v}{6} = 1/3, \quad p_3 = \frac{\sum_{v=0}^5 c_v}{6} = 1/6. \]

Now that we have all the model parameters, we run a simulation to validate the proposed model. For this simulation, we collect 11,074 palmprint images from 568 different palms. The images are 384x284 and they have a resolution of 75dpi. First of all, we use 100 different random fields to compute the Competitive Codes. Then, we use uniform distribution to generate 100 artificial Competitive Codes to attack each Competitive Code. Each artificial Competitive Code is matched with the true Competitive Code as a brute-force attack. Using the true Competitive Codes, we estimate the distribution of the winning indexes in Table 3 demonstrating that the winning index follows uniform distribution. We also estimate \( p_0, p_1, p_2, \) and \( p_3 \) at different positions in Fig. 3, where black represents probability zero while white represents probability one. Fig. 3 demonstrates that the stationary assumption for \( p_i \) is held. The empirical distribution and the proposed theoretical distribution of non-translated matchings are given in Fig. 4(a). We also plot the predicted cumulative probability against the observed cumulative probability from non-translated matchings and translated matchings in Figs. 4(b) and (c), respectively. Figs. 4(a)-(c) demonstrate the predictive power of the proposed model.

Now we can use the proposed model to estimate the probability of successful break-ins. Fig. 4(d) plots the probability of false acceptance against different thresholds. We show only the threshold between 0.36 and 0.39 since our system generally operates in this range. Assume that our system can make 1 million comparisons, 10 times faster than our current implementations. The corresponding computation times for \( z = 10^1, 10^2, 10^3, 10^4 \) and \( 10^5 \) are 1.16 days, 11.5 days, 115 days, 3.17 years and 31.7 years, respectively. The computation times and the probabilities of false acceptances demonstrate that it is impossible to use brute-force to break into our system.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TABLE 3 DISTRIBUTION OF WINNING INDEXES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Winning index</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Probability</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Fig. 3. (a)-(d), the estimated \( p_v \) at different positions, respectively, where black represents probability zero while white represents probability one.
multinomial distribution to describe the relationship as the matching scheme, we set up a projected

\[ W. \text{ Shu and D. Zhang, "Automated personal identification by palmprint"}, \textit{Optical Engineering}, vol. 37, no. 8, pp. 2359-2363, 1998. \]

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This paper presents a systematic analysis of brute-force break-ins directed against our palmprint system. Using Competitive Code as the features and angular distance as the matching scheme, we set up a projected multinomial distribution to describe the relationship between the probability of false acceptance and the number of attacks. According to our analysis, when the system threshold is set to lower than 0.39, it is computationally infeasible to break into our palmprint system using brute-force attacks.

Fig. 4 Model validation and predictions (a) empirical and theoretical distributions from non-translated matchings, (b) a plot of predicted cumulative probability against observed cumulative probability for non-translated matchings, (c) a plot of predicted cumulative probability against observed cumulative probability for translated matching and (d) the probability of false acceptances against different thresholds.

V. CONCLUSION

This paper presents a systematic analysis of brute-force break-ins directed against our palmprint system. Using Competitive Code as the features and angular distance as the matching scheme, we set up a projected multinomial distribution to describe the relationship between the probability of false acceptance and the number of attacks. According to our analysis, when the system threshold is set to lower than 0.39, it is computationally infeasible to break into our palmprint system using brute-force attacks.

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