About the Speaker:


Dr Seung Han Yoo received his PhD in Economics at Cornell University in 2008. He is currently a Postdoctoral Fellow at National University of Singapore. His field of interest is in applied microeconomic theory, game theory, public economics and development economics. He has published in Economic Theory and Review of Economic Design. 

Abstract:

This paper analyzes “revolving doors” with interaction between human capital and reputation-building aspects in a model, in which each government official regulates multiple firms simultaneously. We show that (i) there exists an optimal division rule for collusion between a sequence of “qualified” regulators and a firm; (ii) as the regulators increasingly benefit from the collusion, they strictly decrease regulation rates for the firm under collusion while strictly increasing regulation rates for a firm not under collusion; and (iii) post-government-employment restrictions are not “effective” policies, and an alternative policy can be suggested.

Reservation:

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