About the Speaker:

Dr Fu is an Assistant Professor of Business Policy at NUS. His main research interests are in the areas of Game Theory and Industrial Organization. He has published in several leading journals in his field, such as Games and Economic Behavior, Public choice, and Economic Inquiry.

Abstract:

This paper studies the optimal design of R&D contests. A sponsor attempts to speed up the development process. She divides a budget between the provision of an inducement prize and the provision of efficiency-enhancing subsidies to the competing .rms. The functions of these instruments differ and they provide complementary incentives. In the optimum, subsidies increase while the prize decreases, when the innovation process is more uncertain, or if there is greater private benefit for the winner. Further, we identify sensible conditions, under which the optimal contest preferentially subsidizes the .underdog.(the initially weaker firm) or the “favorite”.

Reservation:

Admission is free.  Please reply to Christina, e-mail: achristina@ntu.edu.sg or Tel: 6790-5689 to confirm your attendance.